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Alton Keith Gilbert, a retired naval officer, uses a descriptive survey method
of research through letters, operational
documents, fitness reports, personal
accounts, and awards to chronicle the
biography of Admiral John “Slew”
McCain.
The book builds a strong sense of the
character and tenacity of McCain and
his ability as a warfighter through one
of the most difficult periods of World
War II. From his commissioning as an
ensign to admiral, McCain was influenced by the Navy’s greatest leaders.
The author describes the development
of McCain as he progressed through his
sea and shore assignments. The study
culminates in a detailed description of
the war in the Pacific and the tactics
used, particularly when dealing with
Japanese kamikaze pilots, under
McCain’s operational leadership.
An intriguing aspect of this book is the
detailed description of the political
dealings among the Navy’s senior leaders. This allows the reader to understand some of the activity behind the
scenes that ultimately shaped the outcome of the war. It is clear that McCain
was a warrior’s warrior who literally
worked himself to death: “After Japan
surrendered on September 2, 1945,
McCain flew back to his home in the
U.S. and died in his bed the next day—
perhaps from heart failure but more
probably from exhaustion.” His dedication to the country, accomplishment of
the mission, and loyalty to his superiors
are constant themes of the book.
The extensive resources and the author’s
personal experience as a naval officer
make this a credible, historically accurate work. Gilbert’s style brings to life
the experience of the Pacific War. In
addition, specific data regarding the
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losses of personnel and equipment only
enhances the understanding of the impact of that war on both the U.S. and
Japanese forces. The bibliography is a
great resource for anyone who desires
additional information on the topic.
The only criticism I have relates to the
title. The book comes up a little short
on the actual leadership characteristics
of McCain, and I found myself searching for those qualities in his style and
character. Yet this is a must-read for
anyone who desires to learn about another one of the great admirals of
World War II.
THOMAS ZELIBOR

Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (Retired)
Naval War College

Osborne, Eric W. The Battle of Heligoland Bight.
Indianapolis: Indiana Univ. Press, 2006. 141pp.
$27.95
Butler, Daniel Allen. Distant Victory: The Battle of
Jutland and the Allied Triumph in the First World
War. Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security International, 2006. 251pp. $44.95

After two decades of unrelenting publishing on the land war of 1914–18, it is
nice to see attention being paid to the
war at sea, for that effort ranged from
distant blockades, mine warfare, unrestricted submarine warfare, and dashing
destroyer melees, to the largest pitched
surface fleet battle to that time. Both
authors tell their stories with a passion
for narrative, paying close attention not
only to admirals but also to the “common sailor” at war. Both come well prepared: Osborne, of Virginia Military
Institute, has published Britain’s Economic Blockade of Germany, 1914–1919
(2004) and Cruisers and Battle Cruisers:
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An Illustrated History of Their Impact
(2004), while Butler, a former U.S.
Army officer and media commentator,
is the author of The Age of Cunard
(2004).
Osborne’s Battle of Heligoland Bight is
solid naval history. On 28 August 1914
British cruisers, destroyers, and submarines descended into the Heligoland
Bight and surprised German scouting
forces, which lost the light cruisers SMS
Mainz, SMS Koln, SMS Ariadne, and
the torpedo boat V-187, as well as 1,251
officers and men killed, wounded, or
captured. The British, in contrast, suffered damage to one light cruiser and
three destroyers, as well as thirty-five
officers and men killed and forty
wounded. Beyond these losses, the importance of the battle lies in the fact
that it reinforced the already timid
stance of the German High Sea Fleet
command.
Osborne’s two major contributions are
at the command level and at the tactical
level. Senior commanders, British and
German, performed woefully. There
was a lack of coordination with the
forces at sea and among the forces engaged in battle. There were also problems with communication (delays in
decoding messages and jammed transmissions) and an overall failure to provide commanders with intelligence on
the composition and position of enemy
forces.
Officers who today fear that in a “real”
war the enemy may well deprive them
of cybernetic capabilities must read this
book. Heligoland showed what it was
like to fight “blind” and under adverse
conditions. Clausewitz’s “fog of war”
was omnipresent, especially on the British side: battle signals were misread;
major units put out to sea without

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol60/iss2/21

C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Spring 2007.vp
Monday, May 14, 2007 3:57:52 PM

notifying other commands; cruisers attempted to ram their own submarines;
submarines made attack runs on their
own cruisers; and destroyers engaged a
Norwegian neutral, mistaking it for a
German minelayer. The German command did not perform much better. It
failed to appreciate the size of the British force and refused to recognize that
it was supported by battle cruisers. It
also hesitated to send out its own battle
cruisers in time to assist. The fact that
German battleships had to wait hours
for high tide so they could cross the
Jade Bar at Wilhelmshaven did not help
matters, nor did the true “fog of war,”
namely, a heavy fog that swirled around
Heligoland all that day. In short, this is
a superb book on the all but forgotten
first surface battle of World War I.
Distant Victory, of course, has the advantage that it is about a well known
battle, the greatest in history to that
date. On 31 May 1916, off Denmark’s
Jutland Peninsula, twenty-four British
dreadnoughts and their escorts squared
off against sixteen German dreadnoughts and their escorts—in all, 151
British warships against ninety-nine
German warships. Butler relates the resulting battle in gripping, dramatic
style. He has a keen eye for the bold
narrative, whether speaking of a destroyer or a battleship, a commander or
a gunner. He follows the traditional
reading of Jutland, that it was a tactical
German victory (fourteen British ships
were lost to the Germans’ eleven, and
6,784 British casualties as against 3,058
German) but a British strategic victory,
insofar as the High Sea Fleet failed to
break the Grand Fleet’s iron grip on the
exits of the North Sea. As the New York
Herald trenchantly put it on 3 June
1916, “The German fleet has assaulted
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its jailer, but it is still in jail.” Unfortunately, Butler fails to draw on the greatest strategic lesson for the Germans: on
4 July Admiral Reinhard Scheer, the
“victor of the Skagaerrak,” informed
Kaiser Wilhelm II that further fleet actions would be futile and that only “the
defeat of British economic life, that is, by
using the U-boats against British trade,”
could swing the balance in the war.
Lamentably, Butler’s lack of familiarity
with German documents and recent
historiography mars an otherwise interesting book. Apart from misspelled
German words and ships’ names, there
are major howlers. Thus Ludendorff is
raised to the nobility as “von,” Hugo
von Pohl in 1914 is listed as the High
Sea Fleet’s chief of staff rather than as
Chief of the Admiralty Staff in Berlin,
Karl Doenitz is cited as a World War I
“destroyer captain,” and German diplomatic and naval files are situated at
Koblenz rather than at Berlin and
Freiburg, respectively. Further, while
one can accuse the German naval command of timidity, it seems unjust to ascribe “cowardice” to them. Hyperbole
abounds. Did Jutland really “dictate”
that “Germany would lose the First
World War”? Was it “the decisive moment of the First World War”? Did it
“decide” the “very course of the war”?
Was the German failure to intercept
British cross-Channel troop transports
in August 1914 the “lost opportunity”
that “ultimately decided the course of
the war”?
Finally, Butler’s claims that “three generations of histories” have failed to look
at the “strategic aftermath” of the battle
and that they have failed for ninety years
to ask why the Germans never again
faced the Grand Fleet in battle, or why
they turned instead to unrestricted
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submarine warfare, are not just inaccurate but make a mockery of that scholarship. Careful editorial work could
have averted some of this. Regrettably,
it did not.
HOLGER H. HERWIG

University of Calgary

Henriques, Peter R. Realistic Visionary: A Portrait
of George Washington. Charlottesville: Univ. of
Virginia Press, 2006. 256pp. $26.95

The man who was “first in war, first in
peace and first in the hearts of his countrymen” is also first as a subject in the
contemporary revival of popular interest in the founding fathers. In this work
Peter Henriques has provided a concise,
balanced, and scholarly companion
piece to the more comprehensive recent
books concerning George Washington.
Rather than a conventional biography,
Peter Henriques, a professor emeritus
of history at George Mason University
and a distinguished scholar of the vast
collection of Washington’s writings, has
provided an analysis of ten of the arguably most important issues and relationships Washington dealt with during
his life. Especially for those familiar
with Washington’s basic biography,
these thoughtful and fair-minded essays
will inspire further reflection on the
character and career of the indispensable man of the American founding.
Henriques’s erudition and balanced
judgment may be at their most effective
in his consideration of the private
Washington, including an examination
of his beliefs on slavery and religion,
and a reflection on his final illness and
death. Washington, who can be justifiably criticized as a slave owner, in
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